The notion of similarity is common enough to be used in our every day conversation, common enough to toe regarded as comprehensible to any speaker of a language. But at the same time this notion seems to be theoretically overloaded, namely, it is treated as a presupposed explanans of the emergence of meaning by a wide range of theoriespsychological theories, art theories, linguistic theories etc. Similarity seems to carry a heavy burden of explanation in theories that deal with metaphorical and pictorial meaning, with our imaginative and concep tual skills.
The traditional approach to metaphor as an abbreviated simile sees the connection between the terms as based on similarity, namely on some common properties of the objects compared. According to the comparison view of metaphor1 -interpretation of metaphorical meaning consists of singling out those common properties, thus revealing the hidden basis of similarity.
The traditional theory of pictorial meaning resides on the notion of similarity as well. The picture is considered to convey meaning thanks to its similarity to the object depicted, it resembles its model by sharing some of its properties -colours, shades, pro,portions, etc. In fact picture-model relation is often interpreted as an illustration of what is meant by »-likeness«, similarity (and mirror image as its ideal exemplification) is understood as an occurence primarily in the visual domain.
•■M a x B l a c k : Models and Metaphors, Ithaca and London, Cornell U n i versity Press, 1972, p. 35 From the visual domain as its place of birth the notion of simila rity shifts to more general fields. The mirror-image ideal and resem blance to the model as a way of achieving meaning govern traditional art theory as well. Art as a mirror of nature or of society, as a oopy of the real world, art as an illusion or delusion, as semblance or image, all these aesthetic formulas presuppose an underlying notion of simila rity which is usually taken for granted and not thematized at all.
The notion of similarity has received more theoretical attention regarding its role in the explanation of cognitive processes such as identification, classification, conceptualization. Our capacity to contem plate similarities (»theorem to omoion«) seems to enable us to subsume unknown objects under well-known categories, hence to identify, to abstract common characteristics, to form concepts, classes, categories.2 The notion of similarity used so extensively surely becomes less inten sively defined; we are tempted to identify contemplation of similarities with our most general cognitive capacities.
An attempt to redefine the notion of similarity should therefore avoid such general characterization but at the same time offer an ope rational definition that would preserve its applicability to different domains. Such a redefinition may also oause certain disappointment, namely -although on one hand, we intend to confirm the multifold functioning of our contemplation of similarities in the formation of metaphorical and pictorial meaning in our imaginative and cognitive processes, on the other hand, we shall restrict its explanatory power. Similarity is often a springboard but not a magic wand that solves all the problems. Raising the issue of similarity seems useful as a prepara tory step for the explanation of the emergence of meaning in different domains, but should not be regarded as its substitute. It should also be noted that it is neither our aim nor domain to analyse psychological processes that lead to our similarity judgements. Our domain is restricted to theoretical dispute, our aim is to reach an operational definition that would secure a plausible ground for further semantical analysis.
Similarity is usually understood as a result of the process of compa ring, as feature matching3 whereby we abstract features oommon to the objects that are being compared. Similarity is not »asserted in any absolute sense«,4 it is always similarity in a certain respect, in all other respects the objects compared are characterized as »different*. Simila rity may also be interpreted as if it admited of degrees,5 6 in which case it becomes a function of the amount of abstracted common properties. As similarity is also viewed as a symmmetrical and reflexive relation, it tends to overlap with the notion of identity.
The definition of similarity as feature matching sounds rather plausible, but at the same time it raises at least two important questions, namely: How many common features do we need to treat objects as similar? Are all common features equally relevant in esta blishing similarity? If not -what is the criterion by which we judge certain features as relevant or irrelevant?
If similarity is to be regarded as similarity in a certain respect, only one common property should suffice. In such a case similarity would be a trivial relation, namely -everything is like everything else in a certain respect.8 In answer to the first question we have to state that although one common feature does not seem enough, it surely is difficult if not impossible to answer at which point idoes the quantity of common traits turn into the quality of similarity.
Suppose the anwer to the first question was »more than one«. Is the fact that some objects share more than one attribute not only necessary but also a sufficient condition for an insight into likeness? Consider the following example: At the moment I am observing a book, a pen, a glass. They may have many common properties, for example: they belong to me, they lie on my table, they were bought the same day, sold at the same price etc. Yet, despite these common properties I would hardly be inclined to declare these objects to be similar.
From this example one oould conclude that to possess more than one common property can be regarded as necessary, but not as sufficient condition for similarity. Not all the oomrnon features are equally rele vant for our similarity judgements; whether two objects are considered to be similar or not -depends on the relevance of properties which are singled out as common.7 The final import of this example can be The further task would surely be the definition of such a criterion. The search for an established criterion that discerns relevant from irrelevant features may drive us to the essentialist position that reduces similarity to conceptual correspondence. Such a position is untenable for two reasons; first -there are too many oounter cases where not essential, but arbitrary, contingent features of objects beoome relevant for similarity, and, seoond -the idea that conceptual relevance of features should account for similarity is opposed to our previous assumption about the role of similarity in the process of conceptuali zation. Namely, if similarity is understood as the ground for the forma tion of concepts, it cannot at the same time be explained by conceptual correspondence.
Another way in the attempt to establish a criterion of relevance would be to insist on the primacy of the visual domain and stress the relevance of phenomenal, perceptual characteristics of objects. Indeed, although similarity cannot be restricted to the visual domain, its pri macy cannot be ignored. Pictorial meaning by its very nature depends on visual oorrespondances; metaphors and art in general are often praised for their »ability to set 'before the eyes' the sense they display«8; our cognitive capacites are often metaphorically characterized in terms of visual experience (insight, seeing, vision, light of reason etc.)
The fact that most common cases of similarity judgements are based on visual perception also supports the idea that the criterion of rele vance should imply the preference of visual, or more generally, per ceptual features. One obvious weakness of such a criterion would be the fact that it oould not account for similarities on a more abstract level. It is also not determinate enough because it offers no criterion of choice among the phenomenal properties themselves. Namely, which perceptual properties are to be regarded as high-salient and which as low-salient depends on the context, on our interests etc.9, consequently, the preference of phenomenal characteristics is too weak a determina tion.
The definition of similarity as feature matching that implies a crite rion by which we abstract features relevant for matching seems thus to approach a dead-end. The attempt to establish such a criterion from an essentialist point of view contradicted the previously formulated empiristic interpretation of concept formation. Furthermore, it contra dicted the evidence, i. e. common cases of similarity judgements that imply primacy of visual and preference of perceptual domain. Although obvious, such a preference still does not offer a single criterion; it is either too narow -giving no acoount of the similarities on the con ceptual level, or too broad -giving no acoount of the choice among phenomenal features. Without an established criterion of salience of features our similarity judgements seem to be arbitrary or based on subjeotive affinities. Nevertheless this conclusion is not supported by the evidence; most people agree in their similarity judgements and are able to give stan dard answers about the supposed objective ground of similarity, abstracting common features of the objects compared. If there is no single criterion for the abstraction of features the question is: what enables us to single out relevant common properties in each case? The answer we are suggesting is: the perception of similarity itself; it is after we have noticed the similarity that we are able to analyse our experience, to single out common features and thus to try to justify our impression.
To stress the primacy of the perception of similarity and the aposteriority of feature matching seems to engage us in a futile discussion about »the ultimate terminus of explanation that w ill yet itself be explained«10. Such a discussion may also be interpreted in terms of the realist -antirealist struggle, as if the most important question was -Does similarity exist before it is perceived?* 11 Questions like this one imply further discussions about the cognitive import of our similarity judgements and persist in the debates upon »creativity«12 in.metaphors and in art.
As it is rather obvious that all-embracive topics like these cannot be adequately discussed within the limits of this article, we shall have to put them aside and leave the latter remark unanswered. As far as the former remark is concerned, it surely would bear some weight if the perception of similarity could be identified with feature matching, that we claim is not the case. Namely, the perception of similarity not only precedes feature matching, but also cannot be reduced to it, or, for those who prefer the other way round -the list of abstracted common properties is irreducible to the perception of similarity. Our similarity judgements are not based on already abstracted common pro- perties, but on the perception of a relation pattern that represents a precondition for the abstraction of oommon features and their con ceptual matohing.
The view of similarity we are defending here is inspired by Ricoeur's rehabilitation of similarity in the interpretation of metaphori cal meaning13 and is derived from late Wittgenstein's idea of 'family resemblances'. We see the definition of similarity as feature matching to be inadequate because it does not answer the vital questions that it raises, namely -how many and what specific features do objects need to share to be regarded as similar. Maybe the fact that these questions are impossible to answer suggests that the questions themselves were wrong, that we cannot expect our perception of similarity to be explained in terms of feature matching, of abstracting oommon traits.
Let us recall the well-iknown Wittgenstein's words: »Don't say: »There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'« -but look and see whether there .is anything oommon to all. -For if you look at them you will not see something that is com mon to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!«14 Applied to our topic these words may be understood not only as methodological instructions, but read vice versa as an implicit answer to the question about the notion of similarity: Similarities, relation ships are what we see and not what is oommon to all (games); i. e. they may not be identified with lists of oommon properties, nor with a single common denominator. To ask whether two things are similar is not the same question as to ask whether they have something in oommon; similarities are discovered by 'seeing', lists of oommon pro perties by 'thinking'.
As we have already mentioned before, it is not our intention to ask about the nature of the psychological process whereby we 'perceive' similarities. (Uneasiness about this may also be noticed in our vocabu lary.) We only daim that this process (contemplation, insight, intuition, perception, or whatever it be15) cannot be identified with the abstraction of oommon features. It precedes such an abstraction and it occurs pri marily on a phenomenal level.
So we have finally reached our operational definition: Similarity is a 'perceived' pattern of relation correspondances. This pattern may aposteriori be analysed by the matching of oommon traits, but such an analysis cannot replace the perception of similarity itself. The per- ception of similarity precedes feature matching and enables it by offe ring a criterion for the abstraction of relevant features. What the per ception of similarity does not account for is the very abstraction of features, as well as their comparison, these being processes that already occur on the conceptual level. Similarity may thus be understood as a precondition for the processes on a more abstract level, but neither as their explanandum, nor as their explanans.
The perception of similarity does not result from the process of comparing common features abstracted according to an unknown crite rion. It is an instant grasp of a recognized relation pattern that itself represents a criterion for further abstraction or inferences. It is not a result of an exclusive mental process, but is itself included in some of the important cognitive capacities.
VANDA BOŽIČEVIĆ: O POJMU SLIČNOSTI

Sažetak
Naglasivši značaj pojma sličnosti za teorije značenja, autorica raspravlja o definiciji sličnosti kao podudaranju svojstava, te dokazavši njenu nepriklad nost nudi drugačiju operacionalnu definiciju sličnosti izvedenu iz ideje 'obi teljskih sličnosti' kasnog Wittgensteina. Sličnost je ovdje shvaćena kao 'opažen' uzorak relacijskih podudarnosti koji prethodi lučenju zajedničkih svojstava i na njega je nesvodiv.
